WORKERS AS GEOGRAPHICAL ACTORS\textsuperscript{1}

TRABALHADORES COMO ATORES GEOGRÁFICOS

TRABAJADORES COMO AGENTES GEOGRÁFICOS

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ABSTRACT: In this paper I first detail some of the geographical concepts that help us make sense of capitalism's spatiality. I then provide several brief vignettes which illustrate how conflicts over how capitalism's geography is made can be central to disputes both between and within groups of workers and capitalists. The paper's purpose is to argue that understanding how social life is geographically structured can add important insights to explaining economic and political praxis.

KEYWORDS: Space. Workers. Labor Geography.

RESUMO: Neste artigo serão detalhados alguns conceitos geográficos que nos ajudam a entender a espacialidade do capitalismo. Em seguida, será fornecido breves exemplos que ilustram como os conflitos tanto entre grupos de trabalhadores como entre estes e os capitalistas são centrais para compreensão da produção da geografia do capitalismo. O artigo defende que compreender a forma como a vida social é geograficamente estruturada pode nos dar insights importantes para explicar as práticas econômicas e políticas.


RESUMEN: En este artículo se detallarán algunos conceptos geográficos que nos ayudan a entender la espacialidad del capitalismo. A continuación, se proporcionarán breves ejemplos que ilustran cómo los conflictos tanto entre grupos de trabajadores como entre éstos y los capitalistas son centrales para comprender la producción de la geografía del capitalismo. El artículo defiende que comprender la forma en que la vida social es geográficamente estructurada puede darnos insights importantes para explicar las prácticas económicas y políticas.


Capitalism is a geographically structured economic system. This is because capital and labor need to be brought together in certain geographical configurations if accumulation is to occur. These configurations are what David Harvey calls capitalism's

\textsuperscript{1} This article was first published in slightly different form in \textit{Labor History} 53.3: 335-353 (2012) and is reprinted by permission.

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‘spatial fix’. For example, the further that workers are forced to travel from their place of residence to a place of work, then the less time will they have in any 24-hour period in which to work, a fact that can dramatically affect their productivity. In turn, this limitation over the amount of time in any given day that workers can spend actually laboring may lead employers to devise various strategies to ensure that workers are readily available to them, such as through constructing company towns or dormitories close to workplaces. At the same time, in order for the surplus value within commodities to be realized, landscapes of consumption must be created – consumers must have locations in which to make purchases and must have a means of physically accessing these locations. The result is that, in order for surplus value to be extracted and realized, capital must collectively invest in ‘factories, dams, offices, shops, warehouses, roads, railways, docks, power stations, water supply and sewage disposal systems, schools, hospitals, parks, cinemas, restaurants – the list is endless’. To be able to reproduce themselves over time, in other words, capitalists have a vested interest in ensuring that the geography of capitalism is constructed in certain ways, ways that facilitate the realization of profit and the accumulation of capital.

However, to be able to reproduce themselves both socially and biologically, workers, too, have a vested interest in ensuring that the economic landscape is constructed in certain ways. Hence, they may seek to make certain that there are jobs in their local community or that there is sufficient housing of a good quality in which they can raise families, goals which may lead them to offer wage concessions so as to attract capital investment to their community or to pressure local governments to build more public housing and/or to regulate its provision by private landlords. As might be imagined, though, the ways in which collective capital hopes to construct the landscape (as a landscape of profitability, for instance) and the ways in which workers may hope to construct it (as a landscape which facilitates their self-reproduction) may be quite different. Such differences can lead to intense struggles between them to shape the economic landscape in some ways and not in others – capitalists may prefer a landscape of high unemployment so as to be able to secure low wage rates or may even wish to abandon

3 Harvey, Limits to Capital.
4 For examples, see: Dinius and Vergara, Company Towns; Pun and Smith, ‘Dormitory Labour Regimes’.
5 Harvey, Limits to Capital, 233.
particular places so as to secure higher profits elsewhere, whereas workers may prefer landscapes of low or no unemployment.

Whilst recognizing that capitalists and workers may have different visions for how they would prefer the economic landscape to be structured, it is equally important to recognize that different groupings within these two broad categories may likewise have different visions. For example, workers in a community with few jobs may welcome the closure of a plant in another and the relocation of its jobs to their own, a decision that workers in the community losing the plant may oppose. Likewise, employers in a particular community may encourage local government to build roads so as to gain access to workers in the surrounding region, whereas employers in this regional hinterland may oppose such construction for fear that their employees will now be able to more easily commute to better job opportunities elsewhere and that, consequently, they will lose their labor force or may have to increase wages to hold on to it.

As these brief examples highlight, then, spatial considerations and struggles over geography can play central roles in workers’ and employers’ political and economic praxis. Recognizing this fact, in this paper I first outline the case for conceptualizing capitalism as an inherently geographically structured system of organizing life. I then detail several vignettes to highlight instances where struggles over space and the configuration of the geography of capitalism were central to the political machinations of workers and their employers. The paper ends with some brief summary comments.

THEORIZING THE SPATIALITY OF CAPITALISM (AND OTHER MODES OF PRODUCTION)

For the past three decades or so, economic geographers – especially those drawing upon Marxist theory – have sought to understand capitalism as an inherently geographical system. There is not space here to detail all of this work. However, the key argument that they have made is that the economic landscape – that is to say, the ways in which the economic relations of capitalism or any other mode of production are constituted geographically and play out spatially – must be constructed in certain ways. If Marx, then,

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was concerned to explore how men [sic] make their own history but not under the
conditions of their own choosing, such geographers have been keen to understand how
people make their own geographies, if likewise not under the conditions of their own
choosing. These efforts have been designed not simply to replace a historical focus with a
geographical one but, instead, to develop a truly historical-geographical materialism. Thus,
although there are moments where Marx was particularly insightful when it comes to
theorizing capitalism’s spatial relations, until the 1970s theorizing derived from his thinking
had generally focused on matters temporal – Marx’s central focus, after all, was on
historical transition (from feudalism to capitalism to socialism to communism) and the
control of time (the struggle over the length of the working day and its division into
necessary and surplus labor time). By way of contrast, in developing a historical-
geographical materialism these economic geographers have argued that capitalism’s
spatiality is not exogenous to the system, something that is simply the geographical
reflection of the social relations of production and reproduction. Instead, capitalism’s
spatiality is central to how it operates as an economic system.

As outlined above, one of the concepts that economic geographers have developed
to build such an analytical framework has been that of the spatial fix, wherein different
groups of social actors are seen to actively manipulate the economic landscape in particular
ways to serve their purposes. This perhaps reaches its zenith in the form of company
towns, when employers engage in practices of spatial engineering for purposes of social
engineering (like developing ‘ideal’ sets of labor relations). However, even when less grand
geographical schemes are envisaged, employers plan to structure and/or interact with the
economic landscape in particular ways, perhaps choosing suppliers who are located in
particular places so as to minimize their costs of transportation or themselves deciding to
locate their operations in certain communities because of the availability there of specific
types of labor. One of the central ideas to emerge from such theorization of how spatial
fixes are envisaged and struggled for by different social actors, though, is that of the

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8 For example, Marx’s argument that ‘while capital must on the one side strive to tear down every spatial
barrier to intercourse i.e., exchange, and conquer the whole earth for its market, it strives on the other to
annihilate this space with time, i.e. to reduce to a minimum the time spent in motion from one place to
another’ (*Grundrisse*, 539) was an exceptionally perspicacious description of how the railroad of Victorian
Britain was shortening travel times between the country’s major cities and thereby reducing the turnover
times of capital held in the commodities transported between them.
9 Herod, ‘Social Engineering through Spatial Engineering’.

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appreciation that economic landscapes have a certain degree of historical momentum or path dependency to them.\textsuperscript{10} To paraphrase Marx, the landscapes of all the dead generations, in other words, weigh like a nightmare on the brains of those who seek to create spatial fixes different from those presently in existence. This occurs because when a particular spatial fix is enacted it fixes in place the social relations extant at the very moment of its construction – Fordist industrial relations produce Fordist landscapes, for instance. However, as time passes the social relations crystallized within the landscape become increasingly dated relative to those social relations which come afterwards, even as the landscape’s physicality continues to shape the latter’s evolution. Putting this slightly differently, because social relations are constantly evolving, over time the landscapes which serve the needs of capitalists or workers at the moment in which they are constituted will increasingly cease to do so, despite the fact that a particular landscape’s physicality may have decades or even centuries of potential working life ahead of it.\textsuperscript{11}

Whilst recognizing that the landscape laid down under one mode of production/ regime of accumulation will continue to shape social relations even as newer modes of production/ regimes of accumulation come into existence, it is important to acknowledge, though, that at some point the tension between the form of the extant landscape and that needed to serve the developing interests of either capital or labor becomes too great – in other words, the physicality of the landscape presently in existence can no longer contain the contradictions between what is there and what is needed. The result will often be a period of significant spatial restructuring in which cities may experience ‘urban redevelopment’ or industrial regions may see perfectly profitable factories shut down simply because it is more profitable for firms to manufacture goods in other places, a process we can perhaps think of as being the spatial homology to Marxist notions of the devaluation of the commodity.\textsuperscript{12} Thus, as Harvey puts it, capital builds ‘a physical landscape

\textsuperscript{10} Such landscape momentum is similar to how an oil tanker’s momentum continues to take it in a particular direction long after the captain has given the order to change course.

\textsuperscript{11} By way of example, one could think of how the urban fabric of nineteenth-century cities, built around the railroad, became increasingly constraining in the twentieth century as the dominant mode of transportation changed from that of the train to that of the automobile and truck. Although from a utility point of view it would have been possible to continue using the rail network well into the twentieth century, as the demands of capital accumulation changed new urban geographies were constructed to accommodate the internal combustion engine, geographies which often entailed physically ripping out the old train tracks which had once moved people and goods around the city.

\textsuperscript{12} For Marx, the production process was one in which the value incorporated in the machinery used to manufacture commodities was gradually transferred to those commodities up to the point at which the
appropriate to its own condition at a particular moment in time, only to have to destroy it, usually in the course of a crisis, at a subsequent point in time’. Of course, how long it takes for such contradictions to erupt into any widespread remaking of the economic landscape will reflect how quickly social relations evolve in particular places (societies undergoing rapid industrialization, for instance, will see a swift transformation of the landscape, as happened with northern Mexico after 1965 when that country’s Border Industrialization Program to encourage the growth of maquiladora plants in the region was established), whilst what the new landscape looks like will be the result of political conflicts between the various social actors who may have quite different visions for its future.

Ideas of the spatial fix and of landscapes’ path dependence, then, have been central to the development of a theory of historical-geographical materialism. However, several other concepts have also been important. Perhaps the three principal ones are those of absolute versus relative distance, place, and the socio-spatial dialectic.

**Absolute versus relative distance**

Distance is often thought to be a fairly self-evident measure of the interaction between places. Generally, it is conceptualized in Euclidean terms of how many miles/kilometers place A is from place B. Such Euclidean metrics are fixed – the physical distance between two places (say, London and New York) will always remain the same – and so represent an absolute measure of distance. However, a second measure of distance is that of relative distance, wherein the distance between two places is gauged in either the time or the cost of moving between them. Unlike absolute distances, relative distances can

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original machinery had no additional value to transfer (i.e., until it was worn out through its normal use). As he argued in Volume 1 of *Capital*: ‘Machinery, like every other component of constant capital, creates no new value, but yields up its own value and, as a result, transfers value to the product’ (p.509). However, machinery and other fixed capital in one factory can be put out of operation prematurely (i.e., before all of the value held in it is transferred to commodities) by the development of newer, more efficient machinery or the securing of a cheaper labor force elsewhere. In other words, machinery and plant may still have productive life left in them but are abandoned because it is more profitable to relocate production elsewhere or because a technological innovation has made previous machinery unprofitable to use, even if it is still capable of manufacturing useful commodities. Neil Smith has suggested that the former process is best described as the ‘devalorization’ of capital, whereas the latter represents its ‘devaluation’ – see Smith, ‘Concepts of Devaluation’. As he puts it elsewhere (Uneven Development, 126, emphasis added), whereas devalorization represents a transfer of value from machine to commodity, devaluation is ‘[q]uite different from the routine devalorization of fixed capital in the production process [and] represents an absolute destruction of value’.

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14 Today it is estimated that there are over 3,000 maquiladora manufacturing or export assembly plants in northern Mexico employing more than one million workers.
change dramatically. Hence, as transportation and telecommunication technologies have
developed, the time it takes for people, commodities, money, and information to move
between places has been dramatically reduced, representing a diminution of the relative
distances between them – a phenomenon that Harvey calls ‘time-space compression’.15
Such time-space compression is at the heart of the notion common in contemporary
globalization talk that we are witnessing the shrinking of our globe as most places on the
planet are now fewer than 48 hours’ distance from each other in terms of physically
moving between them (and considerably less in terms of the electronic movement of
information and capital).16

Contrasting places’ absolute distances to other locations with their relative distances
can provide significant insights into how the economic landscape is configured, together
with how to understand places’ geographical isolation or connectedness and how changes
in the relative distance between two locations can shape their interaction. For instance, in
the nineteenth century the telegraph allowed a much quicker diffusion of information
between places and so represented a significant shrinking of relative distances between
communities, but only for those places that lay along the line. Such a geographically uneven
shrinking of distance had significant consequences for how markets operated – those with
access to the latest commodity prices in places like New York or Chicago could corner
grain or meat markets in the Great Plains before those others who were not connected via
the telegraph.17 Similarly, in the twentieth century jet aircraft have significantly shrunk the
relative distances between places, but only if one lives close to an airport which is large
enough to accommodate them. Thus, the ability of airports in New York City and London
to handle jet aircraft means that travelers can fly the 3,500 miles between these two cities in
less time than it takes to drive from New York City to Dunkirk, NY, on the shores of Lake
Erie (a distance of 300 miles, as the crow flies). This distinction between absolute and
relative distance, then, dramatically transforms understandings of which city – London or

15 Harvey, *Condition of Postmodernity*, 240.
16 Herod, *Geographies of Globalization*.
17 Such a sense was captured in Frank Norris’s 1901 novel about California agriculture and industrialization,
*The Octopus*. Norris explored the subjugation of San Joaquin valley wheat farmers to commodity traders in
distant cities, where prices were set and transmitted via telegraph to where the grain was actually grown. As
Norris (at 51) put it, because ranches were ‘connected by wire with San Francisco, and through that city with
Minneapolis, Duluth, Chicago, New York, and at last, and most important of all, with Liverpool [. . .]
fluctuations in the price of the world’s crop during and after the harvest thrilled straight to the [San Joaquin
ranchers’ offices] . . . At such moments [wheat farmers] no longer felt their individuality’.
Dunkirk – is closer to New York City and what this might mean for the degree of their economic interaction.

Likewise, in the case of the iron-ore producing Pilbara region of Western Australia, such changes in perspective can have great significance for how workers think about their interconnectedness with workers in other places. Thus, at first glance, the Pilbara, a barren, arid environment 1,000 miles from the state capital Perth, may appear quite isolated. However, when viewed in terms of its connectivity to other places, we can see that it is highly integrated into the world economy: its minerals are shipped to China for processing and then exported across the planet in the form of Chinese-made commodities; much of the capital which facilitates mining comes from London; and most of the miners who toil in the Pilbara’s ore fields actually live in cities like Perth or even in Sydney, Melbourne, and Auckland (New Zealand) but are flown in for set periods of work, after which they fly home for periods of rest – a labor-supply system known as FIFO (‘fly-in, fly-out’).\footnote{18 Ellem, ‘Contested Space’.} The point in all of this, then, is that we get quite different understandings of places’ nearness and interconnectivity when talking in terms of the absolute distances between them than when we consider the distances between them in relative terms, and this has implications for understanding how economies are organized and how actors like workers may make interventions in the economic landscape. Moreover, it also allows us to recognize that workers’ or capitalists’ efforts to transform the relative distances between places by decreasing (or increasing) the time or cost it takes to get from one to another can be important elements in their political struggles – some capitalists may seek to reduce transportation times or costs through developing new logistics systems so as to be able to access cheaper labor overseas whereas workers may resist this.\footnote{19 For more on capitalists’ efforts to restructure logistics systems, and workers’ efforts to adapt to them, see Bonacich and Wilson, \textit{Getting the Goods}.}  

\textit{Place}

The concept of ‘place’ has often been taken to be a relatively unproblematic one: places are simply seen to be where things happen.\footnote{20 This section draws heavily upon Herod, McGrath-Champ, and Rainnie, ‘Foundations’.} However, as Agnew has argued, ‘place’ can actually be understood to incorporate three related, though quite different, aspects of locality: place as \textit{location} (namely, a distinct point on the Earth’s surface); place as \textit{locale} (that
is to say, as a physical arena in which everyday life is lived); and place as a locus of identity (where localities serve as the focus for personal and collective loyalty, affect, and commitment). Drawing from this it is possible to see that a place’s absolute location on the Earth’s surface determines, for instance, the judicial framework within which its inhabitants live – people living in South Wales have their lives shaped by quite different legal systems from those that pertain in New South Wales. Place, however, also serves as a physical milieu within which everyday life is played out. Consequently, the boundaries of place are constantly being made and remade as, for instance, residents’ growing reliance upon commodities produced overseas extends a place’s economic footprint far beyond its jurisdictionally defined territorial limits. Equally, what goes on in a locality may depend upon how it fits within a broader socio-spatial organizational structure – is this locality a branch plant community or a center for research and development, and how proximate is it to the centers of corporate power? Lastly, place can serve as a focal point of emotional attachment. Hence, workers’ or capitalists’ topophilia (love of place) can have major bearing upon how they feel about ‘their’ places and may cause them to defend or promote them in competition with other places.

Understanding this multifaceted nature of place is important because it highlights that places’ characteristics are derived both from their own internal characteristics and histories but also from their relationships with other places, which may be spatially proximate or quite distant. Thus, as Massey has put it,

21 Agnew, Place and Politics.

This conceptualization of place is important because it means that although all places seem to express a certain uniqueness (no two places are exactly alike), this uniqueness is traceable to broader social processes like capital circulation, to the place’s location within the broader spatial division of labor, and to the articulation of class (and other) conflicts within particular places, amongst other things. It is thus theorizable. This

22 Massey, Power-Geometries, 22 (emphasis in original).
forces acknowledgement that places are not simply idiosyncratic boxes or arenas within which social life unfolds but, instead, are continually reconstituted by the social relations within which they are located. In turn, their historical path-dependence constantly shapes how these social relations evolve. Places, then, are far more than simply a space in which social life exists. Rather, they are a continuously fashioned mélange of meanings, values, and relationships that are effected by shared and ongoing social practices [which] construct, sustain, and transform the context in which economic, social, and political life is produced and reproduced on a daily basis and into which new members are socialized.  

There are several considerations which emerge out of this discussion, with perhaps the principal one being the fact that because people, institutions, and things come together in unique (though not untheorizable) ways in different places, social relationships, regulations, and institutions have a high degree of local ‘stickiness’ and actors are necessarily geographically embedded to greater or lesser degrees in the long-standing structures and relationships of place, an embeddedness which — as we shall see in the next section — shapes their social praxis. Hence, as Storper and Walker put it, the day-to-day immobility of both labor and capital which results variously from their embeddedness in local employment relations, kinship ties, and market relationships, together with the spatial drag of sunk investment (both in terms of plant for capital and mortgages for workers), ‘gives an irreducible role to place-bound homes and communities’ in how they interact and behave. The fact that it takes time and spatial propinquity for the central institutions of daily life — family, church, clubs, schools, sports teams, union locals, etc. — to take shape [and that, once established], these outlive individual participants to benefit, and be sustained by, generations of workers [means that there] is a fabric of distinctive, lasting local communities and cultures woven into the [economic] landscape.  

This ‘distinctive fabric’ both shapes, and is shaped by, the activities of labor and capital on an ongoing basis.

*The socio-spatial dialectic*

The third concept that geographers have found useful in theorizing the operation of capitalism and other social systems is that of the socio-spatial dialectic. This concept developed in the 1980s as a response to previous ways of viewing the relationship between the social and the spatial. Specifically, in the early twentieth century geographers had often explained patterns of economic development in terms of the physical distribution of resources and climate. Such environmental determinism gave priority of explanation to the power of geography – what they saw as lack of development in, say, sub-Saharan Africa was explained by the intensity of climate whereas patterns of industrialization in Europe or North America were largely explained by reference to the geographical location of raw materials. Although environmental determinism had largely fallen out of favor by World War II, the idea that the spatial distribution of one physical or social phenomenon directly explained that of another continued to shape thinking, arguably reaching its zenith with the spatially fetishistic ‘spatial science’ of the 1950s and 1960s in which space was usually viewed as having its own internal logic – in other words, the economic landscape was understood as a somewhat autonomous entity, one largely separate from the social realm and having inner laws of motion. With the rise of critical approaches to understanding economic development in the 1970s, though, many scholars felt that spatial science ignored the roles played by the social relations of capitalism. However, for some the response was to bend the stick 180° in the opposite direction – the geography of capitalism could be explained, they seemed to suggest, simply by understanding the internal dynamics of the accumulation process. The result was that the geography of capitalism was now viewed to be just the reflection of capitalism’s inner economic logic and space was not seen to play any constitutive role in explaining things. Both of these approaches were theoretically unsatisfying, if for different reasons, and radical economic geographers soon began to develop the notion of a socio-spatial dialectic in which it is understood that social relations shape how the geography of capitalism is made but that that very geography recursively

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25 Soja, ‘Socio-spatial Dialectic’.
27 For more on this, see Barnes, ‘Inventing Anglo-American Economic Geography’.
shapes how social relations develop.\textsuperscript{28} In articulating the idea of a socio-spatial dialectic, Ed Soja thus argued that

\begin{quote}
[t]he structure of organized space is not a separate structure with its own autonomous laws of construction and transformation, nor is it simply an expression of the class structure emerging from the social (i.e. aspatial) relations of production. It represents, instead, a dialectically defined component of the general relations of production, relations which are simultaneously social and spatial.\textsuperscript{29}
\end{quote}

Through this concept, geographers and others have maintained that space is both constituted by, but also constitutive of, social relations and practices – as the sociologist Manuel Castells has put it, ‘space is not a “reflection of society,” it is society’,\textsuperscript{30} and vice versa. This means that processes of class formation and action are spatially structured as well as structuring, a fact which forces analysts to consider how the spatiality of capitalism shapes the social practices of workers and capitalists (and other social actors).

\textit{Pulling things together}

Pulling all of these theoretical lines together provides a solid conceptual framework for exploring how workers and capitalists both ‘produce space’ as part of their political and economic behavior but also have their actions shaped by the way in which the economic landscape is produced – in other words, how they make their own geographies but not under the conditions of their own choosing. This proposition that the ‘production of space’ is central to the dynamics of capitalist accumulation owes much to the work of French theorist Henri Lefebvre, who coined the term to describe how the geography of capitalism is made. For Lefebvre, then, there are three deeply intertwined elements to this production and all three warrant consideration by workers and their institutions as they seek to improve their lot, these being:\textsuperscript{31}

\begin{itemize}
\item One of the earliest articles to argue for paying attention to the constitutive role played by geographical location was that by Massey, ‘Industrial Location Theory’. Specifically, she argued (at 38-39, emphasis added) that ‘[s]patial development can only be seen as part of the overall development of capitalism. However it is also true that many of the emerging contradictions of the economic system both take on a specifically spatial form, and are exacerbated by the existence of the spatial dimension. To this extent, consideration of “the spatial element” is essential to all effective economic analysis’.
\item Soja, ‘Socio-spatial Dialectic’, 208.
\item Castells, \textit{City and the Grassroots}, 311 (emphasis in original).
\item Lefebvre, \textit{Production of Space}, 33–40.
\end{itemize}
• *Spatial practice*, which ‘embraces production and reproduction, and the particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation’ and is the social activity which ‘secretes’ a society’s space, that is to say it is the social activity through which economic landscapes are physically made and restructured geographically;

• *Representations of space*,\(^*\) which ‘are tied to the relations of production and to the “order” which those relations impose, and hence to knowledge, to signs, [and] to codes’ and are produced by urban planners, architects, engineers, artists, and so forth using verbal and non-verbal signs and images – maps, models, plans, paintings – and which guide how the built environment is conceptualized and subsequently constructed, such that historical transformations in ideology can be delineated through examining how plans for particular spaces change over time;\(^*\)

and

• *Spaces of representation*, which embody ‘complex symbolisms’ and are the material spaces in which life is lived and in which symbolic meanings are both enacted in spatial form and are drawn from the built environment, as through murals, billboards, vernacular architecture, and the like.

These three elements correspond with what Lefebvre termed ‘perceived space’ (*l’espace perçu*), ‘conceived space’ (*l’espace conçu*), and ‘lived space’ (*l’espace vécu*), and all three elements are manifested in all spaces simultaneously. Even so, as Elden has argued, although these three types of space together constitute a unity, they do not always constitute a coherence, as each one is profoundly contradictory.

This Lefebvrian schema sees a unity . . . between physical, mental and social space. The first of these [*l’espace perçu*] takes space as physical form, real space, space that is generated and used. The second [*l’espace conçu*] is the space of *savoir* (knowledge) and logic, of maps, mathematics, of space as the instrumental space of social engineers and urban planners, of navigators and explorers . . . [s]pace as a mental construct, imagined space. The third [*l’espace vécu*] sees space as produced and modified over time and through its use, spaces invested with

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32 Although in the *Production of Space*’s English translation the term ‘representational spaces’ is used, Elden, *Understanding Henri Lefebvre*, 206, suggests that ‘spaces of representation’ is a better translation of the original French phrase ‘les espaces de représentation’. I agree. See also Watkins, ‘Representations of Space’.

33 For example, the rise of rationalist thought in the late eighteenth century is evident in the urban geography of New York City. Whereas the street pattern at the southern end of Manhattan, laid out during the earliest period of European colonization, has little symmetry to it, the grid patterns of the streets to the north that were laid out in the early nineteenth century and afterwards are a physical manifestation in the built environment of Enlightenment thinking.
symbolism and meaning, the space of connaissance (less formal or more local forms of knowledge), space as real-and-imagined.  

For Lefebvre, then, the spatiality of capitalism is established through this triad and different sets of social actors may struggle with one another over each or every aspect of it, simultaneously or separately – that is to say, workers and capitalists may collectively agree on the plans for a particular space but disagree as to what its symbolic meaning might be, or they may agree on a place’s symbolic meaning but want to see different things happen to it, or they may disagree about both a place’s symbolic value and plans to alter its physicality through, for instance, redevelopment.

STRUGGLING GEOGRAPHICALLY

Having outlined above some of the elements that make up a historical-geographical materialism, in this section I want to provide some concrete examples of how workers struggle over, and engage with, the landscape of capitalism and what this means for thinking about their economic and political behavior. I shall focus upon five brief vignettes, which illustrate workers’ efforts to: (1) control the geographical location of work; (2) control the spatial scale at which contract bargaining takes place and what this means for their efforts to engage with the unevenly developed geography of capitalism; (3) cross space as they seek to develop relations of solidarity; (4) defend place rather than class in the face of capital restructuring; and (5) shift the geographical terrain of their struggle so as to seek advantage in their battles with employers. Although they are not exhaustive, I hope that these vignettes demonstrate some of the ways in which workers’ social praxis both shapes, and is shaped by, capitalism’s spatiality.

Struggles over work’s geographical location

There are an almost limitless number of examples of workers struggling either to bring jobs to particular locations or to ensure that they do not leave them. One particularly significant example – noteworthy largely because it was part of a consciously designed geographical strategy to deal with technological innovation – involves the efforts of the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), which represents dockers along the  

34 Elden, Understanding Henri Lefebvre, 190.
eastern seaboard of the United States (amongst other places), to restrict certain types of work to waterfront areas. This effort developed in the 1950s as the industry was undergoing great change associated with the introduction of containerization, which was eradicating thousands of waterfront jobs. Specifically, containerization changed the geographical logic of employment in the industry because it allowed the potential migration to inland warehouses of much work that had previously been restricted to ports. Thus, whereas in the pre-container era ships’ cargo had, of necessity, to be loaded/unloaded at the waterfront, after containerization’s introduction only the containers themselves had to be handled in port. The much more labor-intensive work of packing and unpacking the containers themselves – called ‘stuffing’ and ‘stripping’ – could be done pretty much anywhere. In response, the ILA fought to secure a number of agreements known as the ‘Rules on Containers’, which were first implemented in 1969.

The Rules on Containers were designed to reserve for the union the right to stuff and strip at waterfront terminals containers holding cargo belonging to more than one shipper or consignee (termed Less-than Container Loads [LCLs]) whilst allowing those containing cargo owned by a single shipper or consignee (termed Full-Shipper Loads [FSLs]) to pass over the piers intact. The reason for the distinction, the ILA argued, was that the work of consolidating cargo belonging to different owners had been part of its traditional pier work in the pre-container age. The key element in this set-up, though, was that the rules applied only to those LCLs that were destined to be stuffed or stripped at warehouses within 50 miles of ports. Those which would otherwise be worked at distances greater than 50 miles would be allowed to pass through ports unmolested. What this meant, then, was that the work of stuffing and stripping any LCL container subject to the Rules which might otherwise have been conducted at warehouses a few miles inland now had to be relocated to waterfront terminals. If the union detected an LCL container that came from a shipper located within 50 miles of a port then it had the right to take the contents out of that container and stuff it into another. This reserved for ILA dockers the work of stuffing/stripping approximately 20% of the containers moving through East Coast ports. Subsequently, the Rules were changed to include FSLs to prevent the practice of ‘short-stopping’ in which containers are hauled to nearby trucking stations and repacked by non-ILA labor to meet over-the-road safety or delivery requirements. The result was

35 Herod, ‘On Workers’ Theoretical (In)visibility’.
that the ILA forced several consolidating companies to close off-pier warehouses and relocate work to their waterfront facilities.

The point to be drawn from this vignette, then, is that the ILA developed a spatial strategy by which it hoped to counter the negative effects of technological innovation in the industry and that, through this strategy, it had an important impact upon the location of work in the industry and thus the economic landscape of port hinterlands.

Struggles over the geographical scale of bargaining and engaging with the unevenly developed landscape of capitalism

Any group of workers seeking to develop a multi-workplace regional or national contract must come to terms with the unevenly developed geography of capitalism, for work conditions and costs of living can vary tremendously across a regional or national space-economy. This is very evident in the US longshoring industry where, for much of its history, the ILA has sought to address the fact that dockers in the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico regions have generally been paid less than those in the North Atlantic region. Although these lower wages did not have much impact upon the union as a whole for the first half of the twentieth century because ports were relatively isolated from one another, after the 1950s, when the newly constructed interstate highway system began dramatically shrinking the relative distances between ports along the eastern seaboard, they began to lead national union leaders based in New York to fear that cargo shippers would increasingly use Southern and Gulf ports rather than Northern ones, thereby leading to job loss in North Atlantic ports like New York and Boston. At the same time, the ILA leadership in New York, long the union’s core port and a place in which dockers’ wages were highest, sought to develop a strategy to address the changes in the industry augured by the geography of containerization’s spread along the coast. Containerization itself had been introduced first in the Port of New York. In response, dockers there had early sought to negotiate various job-saving agreements with their employers, who were eventually forced to concede several work protections. However, the more that the ILA secured protections in New York the more cargo carriers had incentive to ship through ports like Boston and Philadelphia, using the rail and road network to get their goods to the New York City area. Quickly, the ILA realized that having these work protections solely in New York would provide a geographical opening to employers to undermine them by diverting
cargo elsewhere. Consequently, in an effort to secure for dockers from Maine to Texas the same work securities and wages enjoyed by New York dockers, both for purposes of improving other dockers’ lives but also to prevent the migration of work from New York to cheaper ports, the ILA leadership began a long campaign to transform the geographical scale at which contracts were negotiated, from the traditional port-by-port system to a national one.36

Efforts to develop national contracts generally involve pondering a number of geographical questions. Hence, should such contracts seek to provide an absolute minimum below which no workers’ wages and working conditions should fall? Or should they be seen as a way to pull all workers up to the level enjoyed by the most favored workers in an industry? Or should they seek, perhaps, to develop some sort of ‘spatial average’ of the best and worst wages and conditions? Bearing in mind such questions, between the 1950s and the 1970s the ILA leadership in New York (which dominated bargaining within the industry) increasingly sought to secure a coastwise contract that would provide all dockers with wages and working conditions as good as those enjoyed in New York. They achieved this goal in a number of stages. First, in 1957 the powerful New York Shipping Association (NYSA) agreed to a contract covering the North Atlantic ports from Maine to Virginia. Although South Atlantic and Gulf employers frequently pegged their negotiations to what was going on in the North Atlantic (especially as many NYSA members shipped through South Atlantic and Gulf ports), they were not legally part of the same contract. Second, in response to union efforts to expand work protection agreements from New York to other North Atlantic ports (and beyond), the North Atlantic employers in 1970 formed a new multi-port employers’ association, the Council of North Atlantic Steamship Associations. This was because other North Atlantic employers felt that the NYSA was being too generous in its dealings with New York dockers concerning work protections and, given NYSA’s dominance in the region, were unhappy that they invariably had to adopt in their own ports contract provisions which really reflected conditions in New York. As before, the agreement made in the North Atlantic served as the basis for agreements in other ports, such that by the time of the 1971 contract negotiations the union was able to compel all employer associations to negotiate and sign port agreements at the same time. Third, in 1977 the ILA successfully negotiated its Job Security Program

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36 Herod, ‘Labor’s Spatial Praxis’.
(JSP), a program designed to ensure that union guaranteed income funds that had been negotiated for displaced dockers along the East Coast were appropriately funded. The JSP was adopted in 34 ports from Maine to Texas and allowed funds collected in one port to be used to support dockers in another.

Such developments, then, represented an effort to standardize the union’s contract with multiple employers across the entire East Coast. However, although for a time the union was able to pull this off, geographical differences between ports soon began to undermine the contract’s universality. In particular, the high wages now being paid in Southern ports modeled upon New York wage rates meant that Southern ILA members were increasingly less able to compete for work with local non-union dockers, whose wages were much lower. Likewise, Southern ports’ lower cargo tonnages meant that there was less freight upon which to base fees that paid for various JSP-supported work preservation programs, a disproportionate number of whose beneficiaries were in New York. The result was that, in 1986, several West Gulf locals abandoned the national contract and resumed negotiating several items locally. The geographical tensions between different ports’ working conditions, then, were simply too great to overcome permanently within the confines of a uniform coastwise contract.

Struggles to organize across space

Humphrey Southall has argued that efforts to develop solidarity between different workplaces are ‘a process of coming together, of organizing over space’. The example of the ILA’s efforts to create a national contract within the context of great economic and political differences between ports illustrates one aspect of the difficulties involved in so doing. There are, though, other spatial elements that must be considered. Hence, in many union efforts to develop solidarity across space, the physical movement of organizers from place to place is essential. Such organizers bring with them knowledge of conditions in other places, as well as (often) financial and other resources. Given this fact, many of those opposed to such efforts see keeping these organizers out of particular localities or regions as essential to limiting their success. The success or failure of worker organizing, in other

38 Southall, ‘Agitate! Agitate! Organise!’.
words, often hinges upon the ability of different forces to control accessibility to particular geographical locations. One especially apposite example of this struggle over spatial accessibility is provided by the actions of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the government of Margaret Thatcher during the 1984/85 UK miners’ strike. Specifically, the NUM sent organizers (called ‘flying pickets’) from mine to mine as a way to support strike efforts in various regions of the country. However, recognizing that the arrival of militant pickets in those coalfields with less belligerent miners might encourage the latter to strike, the government instructed the police to establish roadblocks to prevent miners from crossing county lines. Indeed, the government’s efforts to limit miners’ geographical mobility was a key prong in its campaign to defeat the NUM by effectively sealing off these pickets’ access to many other mines and so limiting the union’s ability to spread the strike.39

Employers’ or the state’s ability to limit organizers’ mobility, however, does not necessarily mean that worker conflicts in different places cannot be connected across space, for there may be at play what Jane Wills has called a ‘demonstration effect’, wherein workers in one place are inspired by the actions of those elsewhere, even though they may never meet face-to-face.40 Nevertheless, any demonstration effect’s success is likewise underpinned by geography, in this case by how information about disputes and conditions may be diffused from one place to another – information is likely to pass more quickly between places which are closer in relative space than between those which are fairly spatially isolated, for instance. As with efforts to control the physical movement of organizers, so in this case, then, might significant struggles between employers, the state, and workers over the geographical diffusion of information be waged. Whereas in times past these may have involved trying to keep out of a particular community handbills, newspapers, or other subversive pamphlets which might bring information of disputes and campaigns elsewhere, today they might entail blocking access to particular websites or television news channels. All the same, the goals are identical: to limit the spread of information across the landscape and to keep certain places geographically isolated.

In considering how workers may attempt to build solidarity across the economic landscape, it is also important to ponder how differences in conditions between places shape workers’ geographical embeddedness and what this can mean for the types of

39 Blomley, Law, Space.
40 Wills, ‘Space, Place, and Tradition’.
organizations they develop across space. In particular, the geographical mobility/immobility of particular skills has had an important impact upon the types of unions which have developed, at least in certain cases. For instance, Southall has argued that the character of unionism in the mining industry and in the building and engineering industries in Britain has been fundamentally shaped by the ease with which work skills are geographically transferrable.\footnote{Southall, ‘Towards a Geography of Unionization’}. Hence, in the case of mining, the fact that coal seams and types of coal varied regionally meant that skills developed in one mine were not necessarily particularly useful in another. This encouraged a considerable degree of localism in the industry by discouraging the migration of miners from region to region. By way of contrast, the fact that engineering and building skills are fairly easily transferred from place to place facilitated the migration of workers in these industries, which helped promote a more nationally focused unionism. The geographical specificity of work knowledge in these different industries, then, had a dramatic impact on the types of laboring cultures and organizational forms that developed in them.

\textit{Workers’ defense of place}

All social actors are geographically embedded, to a greater or lesser degree, for social life does not take place on the head of a pin. Thus various factions of capital may have significant sunk costs – utility lines, factories, mines which they cannot easily move elsewhere – or may rely on certain types of labor that are only available in particular places. In the same way, workers may also have attachments to particular places – kinship ties, investments in homes that they may be unable to sell, jobs, a sense of affection for the familiar.\footnote{Cox and Mair, ‘Locality and Community’}. Even migrants and footloose capital are spatially embedded, at least temporarily, in the communities through which they pass – through their movement they may escape particular places, but they can never escape place per se; they are always located somewhere. The degree of social actors’ spatial embeddedness, though, can have a dramatic impact upon their political practice. Consequently, workers and fractions of

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\item Southall, ‘Towards a Geography of Unionization’.
\item Cox and Mair, ‘Locality and Community’.
\end{itemize}
capital who find it more difficult to relocate elsewhere (e.g., utilities like electricity and water companies, local retailers, local banks, local mortgage holders, all of whom rely upon a vibrant local economy) are more likely to be involved in local boosterist activities designed to attract circulating capital (and, perhaps, the jobs and incomes it may bring) than are those who can more easily pick up and move elsewhere should conditions in their community become too arduous.\(^\text{43}\)

What is significant with regard to such local dependence is that it can often shape workers’ political praxis in quite unexpected ways. For instance, in the case of the 1987 closure of an Anchor Hocking glass manufacturing plant in West Virginia, the local union’s officers urged workers not to oppose the closure for fear that they would appear militant and that this would discourage other investors from buying the plant and keeping it open. The state’s very pro-business Governor, on the other hand, sued the company to ensure the return of several million dollars’ worth of grants and loans it had been provided by the state not to close the facility. These stances are quite different from what an aspatial analysis might suggest should have happened and show how geography can complicate class analysis.\(^\text{44}\) Equally, workers’ attachment to place may wax and wane, depending upon the context within which they find themselves. For instance, in their analysis of restructuring in the European steel industry in the 1980s, Hudson and Sadler showed how early opposition to steel mill closures generally involved workers defending their class interests, with them seeking to save jobs in the industry as a whole. However, when it became clear that jobs would indeed be lost and that the issue was now where they would be lost, steelworkers shifted to defending their particular communities rather than continuing a broad-based ‘no job losses in the industry’ stance.\(^\text{45}\) The point here, then, is that workers may identify with their class and/or with their place of residence and that whichever of these two identities they emphasize at any given moment can change, depending upon the circumstances within which they find themselves. This, in turn, will color their political behavior.

*Shifting the geographical terrain of struggle*

\(^{43}\) Humphrey, Erickson, and Ottensmeyer, ‘Industrial Development Organizations’.
\(^{44}\) Herod, ‘Local Political Practice’.
\(^{45}\) Hudson and Sadler, ‘Region, Class’.
This final vignette explores yet another aspect of workers’ spatial struggle. Specifically, it highlights how workers may make strategic decisions concerning the terrain on which they wish to struggle with employers. This has been especially well highlighted in the campaign against sweatshop labor in New York City waged by the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE). In particular, whereas the struggle against sweatshops in the early twentieth century focused upon organizing garment workers’ places of employment, UNITE’s analysis of the shifting locus of power in the industry (particularly the rise in the clout of large retailers like Macy’s and J.C. Penney relative to garment manufacturers, thanks to consolidation within the retailing sector) led it to develop a new strategy, one centered not upon the spaces of production but upon those of consumption. This change in focus resulted from two considerations. First, the union recognized that bringing pressure to bear upon garment manufacturers directly was not being successful because the moment that one manufacturer was organized the increase in wages that it had to pay meant that it could no longer compete with other manufacturers in selling to retailers. Second, many major department stores have begun producing their own labels as a way to distinguish themselves from one another and so have greater control over the manufacturing process than previously. The campaign, then, was marked by UNITE’s decision to focus its efforts on the consumers who buy clothing at such retailers. Thus, rather than seeking to organize the workshops where the garments are produced, it engaged in various informational activities aimed at consumers, including encouraging them to bring pressure to bear on retailers to only buy from producers who met certain wage and workplace standards. Through encouraging consumers to threaten boycotts of various retailers the union hoped that the retailers would compel their suppliers to improve conditions or face losing orders.

Such a shift from engaging on the terrain of production to engaging on the terrain of consumption is not something that is restricted to the garment industry. Other unions have likewise shifted their geographical focus. For instance, workers associated with the Service Employees’ International Union’s Justice for Janitors campaign in Los Angeles have changed from trying to organize individual worksites – the buildings which janitors clean – and/or the janitorial firms who directly hire the janitors to, instead, organizing across entire office markets and using street theater in public spaces to press buildings’

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46 Johns and Vural, ‘Class, Geography’.
owners to induce the janitorial companies with whom they contract to improve workers’ wages and conditions. Likewise, members of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Local 11 in Los Angeles developed a ‘Java for Justice’ campaign wherein hotel staff, on their off time, would sit down as members of the public in hotel dining rooms, order coffee, and then talk to hotel guests about their poor working conditions. These actions, and others like them, highlight a degree of strategic thinking by such unions about space and its uses and meanings, together with how to subvert particular spaces’ conventional usage so as to secure their goals – hotel managers, for example, generally do not like to see their dining rooms turned into arenas in which the horrors of working at the hotel can be presented to guests.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper I have done two things. First, I have outlined some of the work engaged in by geographers and others to develop a historical-geographical materialist framework by which to understand the workings of capitalism (and other modes of production). Second, I have detailed a number of examples of workers acting with implicit or explicit geographic goals in mind, together with how the geography of capitalism and of their own daily lives shapes the possibilities for their action. Certainly, I do not suggest that workers always act with clearly thought-out spatial aims. But I do argue that, even when workers are not consciously aware of it, their actions (or inactions) nevertheless have impacts upon how the geography of capitalism unfolds and that they are also shaped by that very geography. Such recognition provides important theoretical insights into explaining how and why workers and capitalists act the way they do.

REFERENCES


47 Herod, ‘Labour Organizing in the New Economy’.
48 Merrifield, ‘Urbanization of Labor’.


